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Abstract 
Plan recognition does not work the same 
way in stories and in "real life, (people 
tend to jump to conclusions more in sto­
ries). We present a theory of this, for the 
particular case of how objects in stories (or 
in life) influence plan recognition decisions. 
We provide a Bayesian network formaliza­
tion of a simple first-order theory of plans, 
and show how a particular network param­
eter seems to govern the difference between 
"life-like" and "story-like" response. We 
then show why this parameter would be in­
fluenced (in the desired way) by a model of 
speaker (or author) topic selection which 
assumes that facts in stories are typically 
"relevant". 
1 Introduction 
Plan recognition in stories does not work in the way 
it does in "real life." Consider: 
Jack wanted to kill himself. A pistol dating 
back to the days of Teddy Roosevelt and 
the Rough Riders was a family heirloom. 
If you encountered this in a story you would seriously 
entertain the idea that Jack might try to shoot him­
self. If asked to quantify your belief you would say 
that the chances were less than one, but more than, 
say, .2. You would presumably say the same here: 
Jack wanted to kill himself. There was a 
rope in the closet. 
Now, of course, Jack would be hanging himself. 
Life works differently. If the facts in the first story 
were true of a friend of yours you would not really 
believe that he would use the gun. After all, he 
probably has rope, knives, pills, and a high build­
ing to jump from. (This is not to say that shooting 
'This work has been supported in part by the Na­
tional Science Foundation under grants IST 8416034 and 
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might not occur to you, but simply that you would 
not believe that he would do it with anything like 
a 20% probability.) We assume that stories give us 
selected, typically relevant, information, while life 
gives us unselected, mostly tangential, facts. Some­
how this affects plan recognition in the two areas. 
This is not news to those of us working in plan 
recognition in stories. However as it complicates 
things, and makes what we are doing seem more 
ephemeral, we steadfastly ignore the fact. Indeed, 
the only published reference to the problem we have 
found is (Kaplan [1978]). Kaplan proposes a class 
of "language driven inferences" which are distinct 
from "domain driven inferences." However, since 
he does not specify what these are, this is really a 
restatement of the problem. We all agree that we 
reach extra conclusions in stories, and thus must be 
making extra inferences. The question is why? (Not 
to mention which one!, and how?) 
We take the position that plan recognition is done 
the same way (in people) for both stories and life. 
Therefore we are looking for a single theory which 
can handle both, and explains why and how they 
differ. This paper will present such a theory, at 
least for the case of how objects in a story influence 
our perceptions of people's plans in a way different 
from the object's presence in the world. In Section 
2 we formulate the connection between plans and 
their objects in a simple first-order version of frames 
and slots. Section 3 then recasts this in probabilis­
tic terms, using Bayes networks. We will see how 
by setting a particular network parameter (the prior 
probability that two things are the same) to differ­
ent values we can get both story-like and life-like 
interpretations out of the network, and thus in a 
crude way shows how a single system could handle 
both cases. Section 4 improves this theory by show­
ing how reasonable assumptions about speaker's in­
tentions, "only mention relevant things," will also 
modify this parameter. We thereby get the theory 
we want: one which handles both stories and "life", 
and explains the difference in terms of a simple as­
sumption about selection in the case of stories. 
2 Preliminaries 
2.1 Objects and Plans in a First-order 
Frame Theory 
We adopt a simple model of plan recognition in 
which plans are complicated actions (ones with sub­
steps) and all plans are built out of a complete li­
brary of plan schemas. Plan schemas are natural 
kinds ( "frames" ) and the steps of a. plan are "slots" 
in frames. In the first order reconstruction, these 
slots are functions from instances of a plan schema 
to the actions which accomplish the step in the plan. 
To take an example we will be using a lot, here is 
how we would say that some person jl is engaged in a 
hanging plan h2, and that a particular getting event 
g3 filled the step in the plan by which the agent gets 
the necessary rope (which we will call the get-step): 
(person jl) 
(hang h2) 
(=(agent h2) jl) 
(get g3) 
(=(get-step h2) g3) 
The last line here serves as the explanation of the 
getting event in terms of a higher plan. Objects in 
plans are also connected to the plan via slots (func­
tions) . So the rope-of slot would associate a hang­
ing plan with the rope used in it, as in ( = (rope-of 
h2) r4 ) . We assume that all slots have restrictions 
on what can fill them ; rope-of must be filled by a 
rope. This is expressed as the general constraint 
(hang 7x)--(rope (rope-of ?x.)). Throughout the rest 
of this paper we will be considering the plan recog­
nition problems inherent in the two stories: 
"There was a rope in the closet. J ack killed 
himself." 
"Jack got a rope. He killed himself." 
We take it for granted that the second example dif­
fers from the first in that in real life we would assume 
that Jack hung himself. 
It is important to note that nothing we say is par­
ticular to these examples. So, more generally, note 
that if an object j fills the slot s in the instance i 
of the plan schema p, where $ must be filled with 
entities of type t, the following will be true: (p i), 
(= (s i) j), and (t (-' i)). These are the only facts we 
will be using in our discussion of ropes and hangings. 
2.2 Bayesian Networks 
Bayesian networks are a way of representing in­
formation about probability distributions, and are 
pa�ticularly convenient for representing networks of 
causal influences. 1 The idea is that some set of ran­
dom variables (for us, boolean variables , denoting 
partial states of affairs, existence of actions, objects, 
etc.) influence other random variables. We write 
t A thorough introduction to Bayesian ndworks may 
be found in (Pearl [1988]). 
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Figure 1: Bayesian network for medical diagnosis 
the variables as nodes, and the influences as as di­
rected arcs, with the direction indicating causality 
(or picked for convenience in non-causal situations) . 
Figure 1 shows a piece of a medical diagnosis net­
work. (In "right heart syndrome" the heart has 
trouble pumping blood, and some backs up into the 
lungs.) 
We will not attempt to defend our use of proba­
bility theory in plan recognition other than to note 
that like all abductive tasks, plan recognition re­
quires putting together many pieces of evidence into 
a probable, but not certain, conclusion. Probabili­
ties are an obvious candidate for such a task. 
We use Bayesian networks to represent our prob­
ability distributions because of the way they sum­
marize dependencies and independencies. We chose 
them over Markov networks, the undirected graph 
representation, because it is easier to specify the 
probabilty distribution corresponding to a directed 
graph. Influence diagrams are generalizations of 
Bayesian networks which include nodes for decisions 
and utilities. 2 We do not need this much expressive 
power because our program is simply a recognizer: 
it neither acts in the world, nor does it model the 
decision-making process of agents in the world. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss 
the tractability of computing probability distribu­
tions in these networks. In general the problem is 
intractable. (Cooper (1987!) If one has a singly con­
ne�:ted network (at most one undirected path be­
tween any two nodes) there is a polynomial algo.. 
rithm due to Pearl and Kim (Pearl [1988}). We 
expect that the networks we need will, in general, 
be mul tiply connected, and we are looking for ways 
to approximate the probability distribution. 
2Sec, e.g., {Schachter [1986)) for an introduction to 
influence diagrams. 
Figure 2: Partial network for the "rope in the closet" 
example 
Finally, we would like to make it clear that while 
this is a probabilistic approach, it is not a statistical 
one. Rather, our approach is axiomatic and logical. 
While we would like to be able to collect statistics 
for the probabilities we need, we have no idea how 
to go about doing this. 
3 The "Knob" Theory 
Now we combine our first-order formalism for plans 
and their associated objects with Bayesian networks. 
Figure 2 gives our Bayes network reconstruction of 
the "rope in the closet" example, though to keep 
things simple it ignores Jack's role, just concentrat­
ing on the clues provided by the words "kill" and 
"rope." The link between {kill kl) and "kill" repre­
sents the idea that the presence of a killing (in the 
story) caused the use of the word "kill."3 Figure 2 
also represents the connection between the hanging 
event and the killing, and the connection between 
the presence of a rope and the word "rope." The 
most interesting part, however, is the connection be­
tween the hanging event, and the rope. As in our 
first-order theory Figure 2 says that the presence 
of the hanging implies the presence of 3ome rope, 
which is denoted by the term (rope-of kl). However, 
3Some people have trouble with the causal interpreta­
tion of the links between states and events in the world 
and the words in the text, as when we said that th� 
killing event caused the use of the work "kill." The wa.y 
to think about this is tha.t we have an observer who is 
writing down what he or she observed. Thus the ob­
servation of a. killing caused her to write it down, and 
thus use this word. Obviously the real story is much 
more complex since it is impossible to write down ev­
erything one observes. Thus our causal connection is 
probabilistic, reflecting the fact that we do not have all 
of the information and causal influences specified (and 
probably never could). The same is true in the medical 
diagnosis case. 
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this might or might not be the same as the one in 
the story, r2. Thus, the presence of a hanging event 
will only predict the presence of r2 if the two are 
the same, (i.e., (= (rope-of kl) r2)). Thus both of 
these condition our expectation that r2 is a rope. 
In particular, if both hold then (rope r2) holds with 
probability 1. 
To complete Figure 2 we also need probabilities 
(the prior probabilities on the topmost nodes, and 
conditional probabilities on child nodes given the 
parent nodes). The particular probability which will 
prove most important for our discussion is the prior 
for (= ( rope-of kl) r2). Before we can say much 
about it, however, we must figure out what such a 
probabilistic node mecm6. In (Charniak and Gold­
man [1989]) we discuss this issue. The. key point 
here is that terms like k 1 and r2 are to be interpreted 
as the outcomes of experiments, where the sample 
space is all the things in our domain: objects, ac­
tions, whatever. In other words, these are arbitrary 
symbols and could, in principle, denote anything. Of 
course, since we postulate that they are the referents 
of words in our text, and since the words only can 
refer to certain kinds of things (the word "rope" can­
not refer to a tomato, or at least the probability of 
this is very low) the words used start the proceBS of 
pinning down exactly what the terms denote. Sim­
ilarly, n-ary function symbols (e.g., rope-of) denote 
functions from n members of the sample space to a 
member of the sample space. The point here is that 
until we know more, the probability of(= (rope-of 
kl) r2) is very low. It is the probability that two 
arbitrary entities will turn out to be the same. If 
you imagined a world populated with, say lO:lO enti­
ties, then this would be on the order of 10-•o. Also 
note that any equality statement will have this same 
prior probability, and thus we are not talking about 
something particular to this example, but rather a 
"fundamental constant" of the system, henceforth 
denoted E. It says, in effect, how likely things are to 
be associated. (Remember, in our first-order frame 
representation, associating one entity with another 
is having one fill a slot in another, and this is ex­
pressed using equality). 
(Charniak and Goldman [1989]) also discusses the 
value of E, and points out that in realistic stories 
and realistic observations there is temporal and spa­
tial locality, in the sense that objects observed in 
sequence will come (typically) from the same por­
tion of "space-time". This raises the probability that 
two things will be equal, because when restricted to 
a small part of space-time there are fewer different 
objects around. In (Charniak and Goldman [1989]) 
we claim that when this constraint is taken into ac­
count, networks for our prototypi<:al stories give rea­
sonable "life-like" probabilities. That is, in the first 
the probability of hang is low, in the second it is 
high. 4 For this paper the reader will have to take 
this on trust. In what follows we will assume that 
the spatial/temporal locality constraint has already 
been taken into account. 
We discuss this particular "fundamental constant" 
(E) because changing it will cause the network to 
assign values to the probability of (hang k1) which 
range from the story-like, on one hand, to life-like on 
the other. To see why this is the case it is necessary 
to have some feel for the flow of probabilities in the 
network. Setting "rope" and "kill" to 1 causes (rope 
r2) and (kill kl) to now have probability 1. The lat­
ter will push the probability of (hang kl) to a num­
ber like, say, 10-3. This would be saying that on'! 
out of a thousand killings is a hanging. The ques­
tion then becomes, will the evidence from (rope r2) 
cause it to go even higher. If E is very low (that is, 
lower than the prior probability of something being 
a rope) the answer is no. In essence given this low 
value, it is more likely that a rope appeared in the 
story "by accident" than it's presence be depend­
ing on this equality statement. But as we raise the 
value of E it becomes easier and easier to explain 
(rope r2) on the basis of assuming both (rope (rope­
of kl)) and (= (rope-of kl) r2). This then raises 
the probability of (rope (rope-of kl)), and in turn 
(hang kl). More formally, let e denote (= (rope-of 
kl) r2), k denote (rope (rope-of kl)), and r denote 
(rope r2). Then P{r I e, k) = 1, P(r I e,•k) = 0, 
and P(r I •e, k) � P(r I •e, -,k) = P(r) If we as­
sume, as will be the case here, that P( r) « 1 and 
P(k) « 1, then at the point where P(e) = P(r), 
P�(ljl = 2. (The proof just takes P(k J r), expands 
it using Bayes theorem, and expands out terms in­
volving r using the above conditional probabilities 
along with the independence assumptions implicit 
in Figure 2.) In other words, by setting E to be the 
prior probability that something is a rope we will 
double the posterior probability that (rope (rope-of 
k 1 )) . This will have a similar effect on the probabil­
ity of hanging. Increasing E still further will have 
an approximately linear effect on the probability of 
hanging until the later starts to approach one. Thus 
at high values of E we get story like interpretations, 
while when E at or below P( r) we get "life-like" 
interpretations. s 
This then gives us our first, crude, theory for com­
bining both "story-like" and "life-like" plan recogni­
tion in a single system. By adopting the Bayesian 
'Those who do consult (Charniak and Goldman 
[ 1989]) will note that the networks there differ from the 
ones here in the placement of the equality node. Noth­
ing in either theory depends on this difference. Rather 
differing pedagogical needs dictated the difference. 
5 Note that turning E beyond P( r) will still not neces­
sarily be sufficieni to hook up very common things, like, 
say, leaves, because their prior proba.bili ty is still higher. 
This seems reasonable. 
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Figure 3: Why one uses a particular word. 
framework given here the parameter E becomes a 
uknob" which can be adjusted to give the kind of 
system we want, a story reader or a real-life plan 
recognizer. 
4 The "Mention" Theory 
The "knob" theory shows that it is possible to have 
a unified theory, but it does not explain why it is 
that we needed two theories at all. Why is it that 
plan recognition differs in stories and life? The knob 
theory takes it for granted that we need two versions 
of plan recognition and just shows how to model 
them in a single system. 
We do have some intuitions about why plan recog­
nition is different in stories. As we said in the in­
troduction, in stories things are expected to be rel­
evant, in life they are not. Or to put this another 
way, we have beliefs about what authors chose to 
include in a text and what they leave out. They 
include the relevant, interesting things, and delete 
the rest. This suggests that we progress toward an 
explanatory theory by including more of the factors 
which lead to things being put into the text. 
We start by looking more closely at why a writer 
uses a certain word (e.g., "bank" ) in a text. In our 
very simplified model the writer uses a word because 
the object in question, first-national-43, is of a par­
ticular type, savings-institution, and a word of En­
glish, "bank," is used to denote such objects. While 
this causal connection is necessary, it is not suffi­
cient. In our simplifications we have chosen to ig­
nore another necessary component behind the use 
of the word "bank," the idea that the writer wanted 
to mention first-national-43. Let us now complicate 
our lower portions of the Bayesian network to look 
like the fragment in Figure 3. Needless to say, as a 
theory of word�choice, sentence generation, etc., this 
is still pretty poor, but it is enough for our current 
purposes. 
Next we want to ask why someone will mention a 
particular entity. This is a complicated matter, and 
we do not have a theory. Rather we want to show 
that there is good reason to believe that if we had 
such a theory it would take over "turning the knob." 
That is, there would be connections in our Bayesian 
network between the node (= (rope-of kl) r2) and 
mention r2. To see this, consider the quite unob­
jectionable rule, "objects used in already mentioned 
Figure 4: Mentioning the rope in the closet 
plans are more worthy of mention that other objects 
(everything else being equal)." This is not much of a 
theory of "mention," but it is hardly objectionable. 
Figure 4 shows the "rope in the closet" network with 
this rule added in. Note that this rule connects the 
equality statement with "mention." The reason is, 
of course, that in our theory we state that an object 
is used in a plan by asserting an equality between 
mentioned objects and the plan-role. That is (::::: 
(rope-of kl) r2) states that r2 fills the rope-of slot in . 
some plan. Now suppose that objects filling roles in 
already mentioned plans are k times more likely to 
be mentioned than an arbitrary object. That is 
An application of Bayes formula is sufficient to es­
tablish 
That is to say, the probability of the equality state­
ment goes up by lc given that the word has been 
mentioned. Thus the fact that the author has men­
tioned an object is grounds for increasing the (pos­
terior) probabilities of the equality statements. Fur­
thermore, our guess is that k is a very large number, 
since very few objects in a scene will be mentioned, 
while a good fraction of those involved in plans will 
be mentioned. Thus, even an unsophisticated rule 
like this may well be sufficient to modify the prob­
ability of the equality to give us "story like" per­
formance for the class of inferences discussed here. 
Whether or not this particular "mention" rule is suf­
ficient, this suggests that some such rule will be. 
5 Conclusion 
. It seems clear that we can expand this theory a great 
deal without much change. So, while we have dis­
cussed inferences about the presence of objects, the 
theory should work for some inferences about states 
and events as well. Consider a story like: 
Jack took Mary to a restaura.nt. Then 
menu was in French. 
Lots of people go to fancy restaurants and most of 
the time they have no trouble reading the menu. 
However in this story we wonder if there will be a 
problem. Our rule for objects filling plans is dearly 
inadequate for this example, but one which discussed 
causal consequences of states would be reasonable 
Thus we have the beginnings of a theory for why in­
ference in text comprehension is different from real 
life . It assumes there is a single parameter which 
governs the difference (for the general case there 
could well be a small set of parameters) and that as­
sumptions about why authors include facts in texts 
mmlify the posterior probability of the parameter(s) 
in stories. For those (like the authors), who believe 
that plan recognition in life must be evolutionarily 
prior with the story process parasitic off of it , the 
fact that this theory takes the real-life case as basic 
is also satisfying. 
Appendix: Work in Progress 
Currently, we are testing the theory discussed 
here by implementing a story understanding pro­
gram based on it. Our program parses simple En­
glish stories like those discussed in this paper. Us­
ing network-construction rules akin to the forward­
chaining rules of a data-dependency network, it in­
crementally builds Bayesian networks corresponding 
to the story (the "real-life" version at the moment). 
These networks are evaluated using an implemen­
tation of the algorithm (Lauritzen &: Spiegelhalter 
{19881) provided by Srinivas & Breese {1989}. The 
program is working, but its network evaluation is 
still too slow to be practical. We are investigating 
other ways of evaluating our belief networks. 
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